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CASE NOTES 1'ti
dustry. 19 Market share is only one of the several factors to be considered
in finding a prima facie violation of this section. A showing that the
merging corporations do a large dollar volume of business or that the
corporation's share of the market would increase in a horizontal merger
does not indicate a violation of this section.20 The current test is not im-
pact on competition between the corporations involved but is one of
qualitative substantiality of the resulting effect on competition in the rele-
vant market.21
In section 7 cases it is necessary to determine the proper "section of
the country" (relevant geographical market) before appraising the prob-
able competitive effects of the proposed merger or acquisition. The four-
county area in which the appellees had offices and were permitted to do
branch banking under Pennsylvania law was selected as the relevant geo-
graphical market in the instant case. The number of commercial banks in
the area would be reduced to forty-one if the merger was effected. There
was testimony by bankers, several of them being competitors of PNB and
Girard, that the larger bank would be better able to compete with large
out-of-state banks, would promote economic development in the area, and
would have no adverse effect on competition. In addition it can be argued
that competition among banks is not as vigorous as in other commercial
and industrial areas generally, partly because of the present network of
federal regulation and supervision over banking activities.2 2 In light of
these facts, the intent of Congress in amending section 7, and prior deci-
sions of the federal courts, the Supreme Court's holding that a merger
resulting in 30% of the market share amounts to a per se violation appears
unfounded.
19 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
2O Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (D.C. Mich. 1960).
21 Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686 (D.C. Del.
1962).
22 See 1 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, S 4.04 (1958), where federal supervision of bank-
ing is referred to as one of the most successful systems of economic regulation.
ANTI-TRUST LAW-SHERMAN ACT: CONSPIRACY IN
PATENT ANTI-TRUST CASES
Singer Manufacturing Company completed the design of a mechanism
to be used in a household sewing machine in April, 1953 and filed an ap-
plication for a United States patent thereon. Singer subsequently pur-
chased the June 9, 1952 United States application of one Harris which
covered the same mechanism. In November of 1955, Singer negotiated a
cross-licensing agreement with Vigorelli, an Italian firm, to avoid inter-
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ference proceedings in the United States Patent Office on conflicting ap-
plications filed by the two companies. Singer then discovered the existence
of a United States application by Gegauf, a Swiss firm, which Singer
believed enjoyed priority over its Harris application. Using the possibility
of litigation and the existence of strong Japanese competition as bargain-
ing points, Singer concluded a cross-licensing agreement with Gegauf.
Singer then convinced Gegauf that Singer was in a better position to en-
force the patents against the competition, and purchased Gegauf's appli-
cation. Singer withdrew its Harris application from the interference
proceeding, and when the Gegauf patent issued, Singer instituted infringe-
ment actions against Japanese and European infringers. Finally, Singer
brought a proceeding before the United States Tariff Commission, seeking
to exclude all infringing machines from the United States. The United
States instituted a civil anti-trust suit seeking to restrain alleged violations
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court, in reversing
the holding of the District Court for the defendant, Singer, held that the
entire course of dealings between Singer, Vigorelli, and Gegauf consti-
tuted an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. United
States v. Singer Manufacturing Company, 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
In essence, the Court held that a course of conduct involving the nego-
tiation of a license and an assignment of a patent established an illegal
conspiracy where an element in the inducement to enter into such agree-
ments was the possible exclusion of infringing manufacturers from the
market. The case establishes no novel principle of law, nor does it ex-
plicitly overturn any previously-established rules. However, the decision
does indicate a furtherance of the trend to require very little in the way
of proof to establish a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. In
particular, the freedom to use the patent grant has been further limited by
the indication that the motives of the parties in dealing with the limited
monopoly will be vigorously scrutinized by the courts.
To emphasize the significance of this case in limiting the freedom of
patentees to interchange their rights under the patent grant, an inquiry
into the elements necessary to establish conspiracy in patent anti-trust
cases is required. Cases involving the use of patents in alleged conspiracies
have often arisen in the so-called "patent pool" situations, wherein a group
of patents are aggregated under single ownership or control.' "Patent
pools" are not illegal per se; in fact, the Court has actually spoken well of
patent aggregation, where the arrangement allows more efficient use of
1 4 TOULMiN, ANTI-TRUsT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (1950); 1 WOOD, PATENTS
AND ANTI-TRUST LAW (1942); Morison, The Patent Grant and Free Enterprise-The
Abuses of Patent Monopolies, 38 A.B.A.J. 739 (1952); Comment, Patent Pooling and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 17 U. Co. L. REV. 357 (1950) ; Note, Patent Pooling and the Sherman
Act, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 1113 (1950).
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patented subject matter.2 However, these arrangements have often led to
per se violations of the Sherman Act, and have been properly condemned
by the courts.3 Such conduct has most often been based on formal agree-
ments.4 In these cases, proof of the conspiracy is not difficult; the issue
becomes solely whether the concerted action in question or its object is
illegal.
Open conspiracies in restraint of trade based upon formal agreements
are rarely before the courts today. In the usual situation, the alleged il-
legal conspiracy must be shown by circumstantial evidence, and the courts
have given the Justice Department broad leeway in the introduction of
such evidence. The so-called "conscious parallelism" cases illustrate the
establishment of conspiracies without formal agreement. 5 In Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States,6 a case involving alleged restraint of trade
in copyrighted matter, the defendant, an exhibitor of motion pictures,
entered into agreements with each of a group of motion picture distribu-
tors. The distributors were to use their influence on other exhibitors in
the area, causing them to raise their admission prices. While it was admit-
ted that separate agreements between the defendant exhibitor and each
distributor would have been legal, the Court found that the uniform price
rise showed that a conspiracy existed between the distributors, without
evidence of a formal agreement between them. Similarly, in Eastern
States Retail Lumber Dealers' Association v. United States,7 the Court
found that a combination of retailers had tacitly agreed that they would
not buy from wholesalers who competed with them at retail. This com-
bination was struck down as an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.
2 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931),
where the Court stated, "An interchange of patent rights ... is frequently necessary
if technical advancement is not to be blocked by threatened litigation.... [Sluch inter-
change may promote rather than restrain competition."
3 Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1944) (division of markets);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942) (price fixing); Standard Sanitary
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 (1912) (price fixing).
4 United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948) ; United States v. National
Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386
(1944); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U.S. 32 (1917); Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States,
226 U.S. 20 (1912).
5 For general discussions on growth of the "conscious parallelism" doctrine, see
Conant, Consciously Parallel Action in Restraint of Trade, 38 MINN. L. REv. 797 (1954);
Rahl, Conspiracy and the Anti-Trust Laws, 44 ILL. L. REv. 743 (1950); Wood, The
Supreme Court and a Changing Anti-Trust Concept, 97 U. OF PA. L. REv. 309, 329
(1949); Adelman, Effective Competition and the Anti-Trust Laws, 61 HARV. L. REv.
1289, 1324 (1948); Note, Conscious Parallelism-Fact or Fancy? 3 STAN. L. REV. 679
(1951).
6 306 U.S. 208 (1939). 7 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
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Mere parallel behavior, without evidence of knowledge and at least
tacit agreement, is not in itself illegal. In the words of the Supreme Court,
Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have made heavy
inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy; but conscious
parallelism has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act entirely.8
The Justice Department thus must show a nexus between the individuals
or corporations who are alleged to be parties to a conspiracy.
In the area of patent anti-trust law, United States v. United States
Gypsum Company9 is analogous to the "conscious parallelism" cases
which have developed in the general field of anti-trust law. U. S. Gypsum
Company issued substantially identical patent licenses to nearly all manu-
facturers in the gypsum industry, thereby fixing prices. It had previously
been held that a patentee may fix the price at which a single licensee must
sell the article.10 In the Gypsum Case, however, the Court held that since
all licensees involved knew the industry was being regimented by this
technique, an illegal conspiracy resulted.
To determine whether a conspiracy exists, the Court will examine the
entire course of dealing between the alleged conspirators. That is, the
Court will look beyond the formal agreements between the parties to
their actual conduct under such agreements. For example, in United
States v. General Electric Company" the District Court for the Southern
District of New York found,
The eight illegal practices already discussed .. .when taken along with the
character of the various licenses and agencies, and the course of dealing among
all the parties, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants
conspired among themselves . .... 1.
More recently, the Supreme Court stated that the existence of a conspiracy
is "to be judged by what the parties actually did, rather than what they
said."' 3
It has also been established that a showing of arm's length bargaining
between the parties does not preclude the existence of a conspiracy. The
mere fact that the negotiations and course of dealing between two parties
8 Theater Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954). See also Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297
F. 2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 369 U.S. 839 (1962).
9 333 U.S. 364 (1948).
10 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
"180 F. Supp. 989 (1949).
121d. at 1011.
13 United States v. Parke, Davis, & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44 (1960). See also FTC v. Beech
Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
321 U.S. 707 (1944).
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are adversary in some respects will not be determinative of the question of
conspiracy. In United States v. Masonite Corporation,'4 a case involving
an alleged conspiracy to fix prices through patent licensing agreements,
the various licensees were attempting to discover competitive non-infring-
ing products, and some of them had actually distributed competitive
products. The Court held that the efforts by the licensees to compete with
the licensor did not preclude the existence of a conspiracy. Similarly, in
United States v. Line Material Company,15 the Court found a conspiracy
even though the licenses constituting the agreements between the parties
"were the results of arm's length bargaining in each instance."'16
From the foregoing, several general principles regarding conspiracy in
patent anti-trust cases can be obtained: 1) Mere interchange of patents
or rights thereunder cannot alone constitute a conspiracy; 2) A conspiracy
may be established without evidence of formal agreement between the
parties; 3) To establish a conspiracy, the Court will look to the entire
course of conduct between the parties and not merely formal agreements,
where they exist; 4) At least implied or tacit agreement on an illegal
course of conduct is required; and, 5) A conspiracy may arise even if the
agreements constituting the conspiracy are the results of arm's length
bargaining.
In the Singer case, the Court followed the principles set forth above.
There was no claim by the government that the interchanges of patent
rights, in themselves, were illegal.17 While there was no formal agreement
to exclude the Japanese competition, the Court held that no formal agree-
ment was required to show a conspiracy.-" It found that the course of
dealing between Gegauf and Singer established an implied agreement to
exclude the Japanese.' 9 It found that this implied agreement was sufficient
to constitute a conspiracy.20 Finally, it found that the existence of arm's
length bargaining did not preclude a finding of conspiracy. 21
The instant case, therefore, enunciated no new principle of law on the
subject of conspiracy in patent anti-trust suits. As previously stated, the
importance of this case lies in the application of existing principles to the
evidence of agreement to exclude a Japanese competitor. The Govern-
ment's case hinged on several statements, made by Gegauf and Singer
personnel, to the effect that the best arrangement should be found to en-
14 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
15 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
1l Id. at 297.
17 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 189 (1963).
18 Id. at 193.
19 Id. at 194.
20 Id. at 193. 21 Ibid.
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force the Gegauf patent against the Japanese.2 2 The written agreements
between Gegauf and Singer in no way mention an agreement to exclude
the Japanese, nor was any evidence adducd showing that a verbal agree-
ment existed. Moreover, no showing was made that Gegauf had any power
to enforce such an agreement, if made, against Singer. The trial court, far
from finding a conspiracy to exclude the Japanese, found that the "domi-
nant and sole purpose of the license agreement was to settle the conflict
in priority. '23 The Supreme Court found this holding to be clearly er-
roneous and reversed the conclusions of the District Court.
The Singer case should stand as a warning to those who must advise
clients relative to their bargaining for the exchange of patents or rights
thereunder. Where a common motive exists to enforce the patents against
infringers, and litigation to exclude the infringer results, little more is
required to establish an illegal conspiracy in restraint of trade.
22 E.g., "We agree that something should be done against Japanese competition in
your country and maybe South America .... [I]t may be possible that we can both
strengthen our positions with respect to the Japanese competition which you men-
tion. . . ." United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 184 (1963).
23 United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 205 F. Supp. 394 (1962).
ASSOCIATIONS AND SOCIETIES: RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES-
PROTECTION OF ENTRUSTED PROPERTY AGAINST
CHANGE IN FUNDAMENTAL DOCTRINES
The Landmark Baptist Church of Traskwood, Arkansas, functioning
on property restricted by three deeds to the use of "Landmark Baptists,"
was rent with a dissension which matured in a bill by the minority group
of church members to enjoin the pastor and majority faction from using
the church property. Their assertion was that the property was subject to
a trust under which the church premises must be used only to promote the
doctrine of the Landmark Baptist Church; and that the pastor had and
was teaching doctrines fundamentally, basically, and radically different
from the faith of a Landmark Baptist Church in violation of that trust.
The bill seeking to enjoin and eject the majority faction failed in the
Chancery Court of Saline County, Arkansas, but this decision became re-
versed in the Supreme Court of that state. At a subsequent rehearing, the
Supreme Court extended the injunction and ejected the majority faction
from the property. Holiman v. Dovers, 336 S.W. 2d 197 (Ark. 1963).
In a case of this sort with constitutional overtones, it is necessary to
establish: the court's jurisdiction where religious matter is involved; the
rights of a minority in this congregational, independent church; the trust
